Why do I think this is gay? WTF is wrong w me? It just seems like the ancient version of demanding a source with a bunch of gotchas in between
Why do I think this is gay? WTF is wrong w me?
Why do I think this is gay? WTF is wrong w me? It just seems like the ancient version of demanding a source with a bunch of gotchas in between
Yeah don't read that dialogue. Read the phaedo, the Parmenides, and the republic. Also try finding a translation that isn't written in retarded "easy" English to simulate the "conversational" Greek shit because that style will make you gouge your eyes out.
taking this advice
I believe you are referring to the form of the dialogue?
I believe you but am married and faithful
This is the exact part I thought was the gayest, it feels like something a 5th grader would contemplate
your commentary is worthless, as are you.
I certainly feel like i properly contemplate the absurdity of reality regularly because of such things but thought maybe reading the dialogues would assist in the process, which I do not feel this one has. But also I guess that must be my own fault
>This is the exact part I thought was the gayest, it feels like something a 5th grader would contemplate
I used to be like this until I got deep into metaphysics and logic. I'm not going to belittle you, I just think you're not ready for this yet. If you keep at it, you might get there.
>I certainly feel like i properly contemplate the absurdity of reality regularly because of such things but thought maybe reading the dialogues would assist in the process, which I do not feel this one has. But also I guess that must be my own fault
Ntas, but the crucial element of the Euthyphro is how the philosopher is situated w/r/t piety. Socrates is about to be formally tried for corruption of the young and civic impiety, and the former charge is suspected of being a result of the latter one. So the question isn't just "what is piety" as an idle curiosity for today, but what ought to be the philosopher's stances to: 1) the gods as portrayed in poetry, 2) traditional practices (prayer and sacrifices), 3) religious providence, and 4) apparently heterodox figures such as Euthyphro.
The second attempted definition of piety (piety is what the gods love) has certain difficulties in the Greek that don't come out so well in translation; the verbs Socrates uses as examples are all verbs in the middle/passive, where one word can have two verbal senses depending on context, either a regular passive (which is how just about every translation treats the section), or a "middle" sense where one enacts the verb on or for themself. It looks so explicitly like logical argumentation that everyone tends to pay almost exclusive attention to it, but I think Euthyphro's implicit first definition (piety is doing what the gods do) is more crucial, since all of the other attempted definitions come out of this one. I.e., there's a very real question over whether philosophy can acquire wisdom, which would seem to be like trying to be like the gods (see Symposium 204a and Phaedrus 278c-d).
>either a regular passive (which is how just about every translation treats the section), or a "middle" sense where one enacts the verb on or for themself.
Redpill me on the middle voice.
(I'm
but not )
The middle voice in Greek is sort of like a reflexive verb. The subject of a verb is the agent and, in a sense, the object.
There's the active:
>I move the rock out of the way
The passive:
>the rock is moved by me
And then there's the middle:
>I move myself out of the way
In the middle, the verb is done by the agent to the agent in some form, but it is sort of in a more abstract sense.
And in the text, being carried is meant to be passive and carrying is meant to be middle (originally in Ancient Greek)?
I'm a bit busy tonight, but I can fill in in the morning for some of what's going on with the middle/passive as alluded to at
. What I'll say for now is that statistically, there's 291 middle/passive verbs in Euthyphro, 208 of which are clearly in the middle, and of the remaining 83 passive verbs, 52 of them are in 10a-11b of the text. I'll go into more detail about what the ambiguity amounts to then, but as a starter, read through that section again and try to reformulate the passives as if they were all reflexive verbs to see how the argument transforms; it seems to have to do with the activity of the soul, which is noteworthy inasmuch as soul is a word that's never used in the dialogue.
Okay, examples of the middle/passives.
Socrates gives the example of "carrying" and the passive "being carried" (pheromenon), which in the middle means "carrying for oneself". The next example is "leading" and "being led" (agomenon), which in the middle means "to lead oneself". The third example is "seeing" and "being seen" (horomenon), which in the middle means "to make an appearance". The play between actives and middle/passives point to ambiguities over what the soul undergoes in experience; carrying and leading are clearly active, but seeing is an active verb that makes up in part a passive experience, since one can't in the vast majority of experiences choose the contents of what is before one's eyes to see. And the passives point to the middle forms as showing that passivity may itself have an activity to it (e.g., if you're a soldier "being led", isn't it the case that there's an activity in obeying and following? And in being seen, isn't it the case that one can mog some other's view, or make up one's own appearance to in some sense determine how wants to be seen?)
So we look back again to the initial verb, "loving" and "being loved"; the active sense of the verb philein (to love/hold dear/be friends) has a nonsexual meaning, but the passive philoumenon often means the beloved in what can be a sexual relationship. This ambiguity points to whether the beloved or loved thing is ever wholly passive, or if it has an activity to it (obviously, a beloved doesn't have to return the affections of a lover, but surely plenty of beloveds will flirt or play along, whatever their ultimate interest in the lover).
Altogether, this section raises questions about two issues, 1) causes, and 2) the soul, and they both coalesce in the issue of to what extent soul is a cause of things. For Euthyphro's second definition, the issue that arises is whether there's an activity to the forms that makes them loved by the gods, and to what extent the gods are analogous to souls if they love something.
What you have to understand is that this isn’t supposed to be a record of a debate between plato and 1 or more people but rather an exoteric and esoteric program for readers
You mean Socrates?
Well uh that's just like your neoplatonic opinion dude
The Phaedrus states that explicitly.
Citation?
He made it the fuck up
Same author but the Euthypro was written much earlier
You didn't even notice hypostatic abstraction occurring in the text, so you were effectively filtered by it, yes.
Can you inform about the "hypostatic abstraction" therein?
No, midwits get filtered. End of story.
Did your eyes gloss over the sidebar discussing the distinction between carrying and being carried? Was it just a linguistic quibble?
breaking my ‘no posting after imbibing beer rule’ to affirm the sheer tenacity of intellect that this poster possesses and yes my breaking of the aforementioned rule implies a collapse of the hypostatic function.
>hypostatic function
break your rule again and redpill me on this
redpill me on hypostatic abstraction (or function?). is it related to the shifting of voice here
in some way?
Disliking Plato is a distinctly female trait. I'm not joking. Go ask the most intelligent women you know to read a dialogue of plato's and see what they think of it.
If you haven't brought up and discussed Plato with a prostitute you are not a real man
is this the one where the opponent was like uhhh I need to go home?
>/pol/naggers have unironically been memed into thinking it is cringe to substantiate one's claims with evidence
At this point I'm convinced /misc/ is the best psyop of all time to keep anyone who might become radical or dangerous stupid and passive.
Mere fact it exists on the clearnet completely unmolested is all the proof needed.
I think you may not be properly engaging with the text. Socrates's entire schtick is forcing people to reconcile and confront both cognitive biases and dissonance in their heads. Socrates wants people to question the foundations of their beliefs, which would indeed require asking people where and how they get their beliefs in the first place.
Tbh this
>SOURCE?!
He doesn't understand the meme.
how does one refute the argument in the euthyphro? where do our morals come from?
What arguments do you have in mind?
Christians just accept that "doing what is pious is good because it pleases God" since the christian God is necessarily good.
Most historical Christian thinkers were not divine command theorists. Yes, God is necessarily good, but God loves the good because it is good, the good is not good because God loves it.
In Christian theology there's no great need (that I know of) to make such a great distinction between these. The Euthyphro argument exists because of greek polytheism and the constant quarelling amongst the gods. When God is not just good, but the supreme good, and all things which He has created are (contrary to what atheists ignorant of the argument of evil may assert) good, the whole debate seems to lose its meaning.
Not necessarily. The final attempt to define piety in the dialogue, "piety is the art of commerce between men and gods" still nics monotheism by investigating the relationship between man and god, for God's interest in man by desiring sacrifices, prayer, and worship, implies a standard outside of God that God appeals to in loving such things.
Only if there are no other gods. And then you have OT Jehovah, Jesus and Allah who are supposedly same supreme being yet demand radically different things.
The arguments in Euthyphro aren't very compelling. Its the starting text because its short and prototypical, but if you want something more substantial start with Phaedo