Why do I rarely see anyone talk about Nietzsche's arguments against Kant on here? This is one of the most important parts of Nietzsche's thought and it's what sets him apart from most philosophers.
To summarize for the thread, Nietzsche argued against Kant's thing-in-itself from the standpoint that the notion of a veil was in itself part of the interpretation. For Nietzsche, it's not a given that there is anything "behind the curtain" so to speak, because "behind" and "curtain" are not a given, either. We project all these notions onto life; they are characteristic of our minds, not of nature, the cosmos, phenomena, or whatever it is we think we're uncovering the truth about in our analysis.
This is a quite unique perspective, and it's the basis for Nietzsche's perspectivism in the first place. If there is no curtain, no appearance, no illusion, then there is no behind, no thing-in-itself, no capital t Truth. All analysis becomes a kind of Münchhausen trilemma; what is really happening is that the analyzer is unconsciously reordering the world in his or her own image with the analysis being the means to that end. This means that while Nietzsche was an atheist, he is distinct from the majority of atheists who are atheists because they think atheism is scientifically valid or philosophically truthful.
I don't see how it isn't just basic perspectivism, i.e. the same criticism he applies to all philosophers. I don't find it interesting.
It is fascinating Nietzsche held him in such disdain, Kant performed something of a revaluation of his own but on a number of points came to similiar/same conclusions of the preceding logic, which could perhaps be part of the disdain? This is seemingly confirmed by Nietzsche dismissing the categorical imperative. Nietzsche also took great pains to disavow nihilism but failed to produce a working framework beyond the will to power as an alternative which can be loosely interpreted or strictly interpreted many different ways. Kant was certainly a more serious and capable philosopher, I personally see Nietzsche as self identifying on the intuition side of things which his fixation on Heraclitus seems to invoke, and by proxy he is just automatically going to dislike Plato and Kant.
I am one of the very fews who have emphasized the contrary: that Kant is indispensable to understand Nietzsche, as a positively constructing influence. Some say via Schopenhauer, but Nietzsche read Kant rather extensively. Of course Nietzsche criticizes Kant heavily too. But even in one of these, he says that Kant is a like a fox that manages to escape the cage but then returns to it. Nietzsche makes more radical steps but in the same direction.
Now, this critique of the thing in itself you say is far from being original to Nietzsche. This is an aspect of Kant’s philosophy that has been attacked since the 1780s with Hamann, Jacobi, etc. and not by chance Kant himself makes the existence of things in themselves something ambiguous, one time necessarily implying their existence, another time denying, at times declaring agnosticism toward them.
Turning more specifically to Nietzsche, his views on power, will to power as universal rule for every being, isn’t a stop to this full fledged perspectivism? This Wille to Power is what makes the productions of the myriad of interpretations, laws we superpose onto the world. But there remains a basic intersubjective cognition of experience.
In his later life he tried to ground will to power in more biologistic quasi-Darwinian terms, but that's not necessarily incompatible with perspectivism as it is commonly understood.
>his views on power, will to power as universal rule for every being, isn’t a stop to this full fledged perspectivism?
It isn't in the case of Nietzsche. I like the analogy of the fox and the cage because it illustrates Nietzsche's stance well. For him, Kant escaped Plato's cage (see what I did there?), but voluntarily returns to it; meanwhile, Schopenhauer escaped that cage, but rejected the next step, which was building a new cage. Nietzsche, on the other hand, realized that we build cages despite what we think or want, and embraced the process. Will to power is Nietzsche's new cage, and he was fully aware of this, but he championed it as being a larger and more robust cage that would captivate humanity for millennia just as Plato's did (we are no closer to finding a more comprehensive ontological theory than the will to power than Nietzsche was and nothing so far has indicated that we will be overcoming it any time soon).
>realized that we live in cages despite what we think or want
Fixed for accuracy
I grasp Nietzsche's metaphor as meaning that Kant's Critical Reason is the shrewdness of the fox that leads it to escape the cage, and that his Ethics, with its Categorical Imperative, is what makes it return to it.
Nietzsche's realizing that we build cages is a manifestation of will to power, every one wants to confine everyone else in their own cages.
Then I think it is a matter of interpretation indeed. The full-fledged perspectivism would say like you that WTP is indeed a cage, but larger. But what is the difference if there is no larger cage to put WTP between the greatest cage and saying that Nietzsche's cage would not be a cage of Will to Power, but Nietzsche's values, Will to Power being implied in each cage already, even in herd values? I think perspectivism cannot be upheld in this way, it would have to demand WTP to be just like any other cage. Plus, we can see that Nietzsche ascribes to it the place of a natural law. It is not by chance that Nietzsche infused his thought with physiology and biology and bickers with Darwin over the latter's conceptual minutiae. Aphorism 651 from the Will to Power about the protoplasm; when he says: ''growth, in one word-- that is life itself.'', or the 681: ''Life is not the adaptation of inner circumstances to outer ones, but will to power''; Aphorism 658 WTP: ''The organic functions translated back to the basic will, the will to power.'' There is one with the title: 'To what extent interpretations of the World are Symptoms of a Ruling Drive'.
So I don't think a radical position of perspectivism, wherein not even a common ground for the production of values (where perspectivism will in truth play a role), is tenable.
I'm in the camp that considers late Nietzsche to be very deceitful. At some point, he started literally advocating for the importance of lying. This is how I view his later ascription of natural law to the will to power. He started doing so because he understood the sway that such arguments have. But, even deeper than this, he also outlined the necessity and value of lying to the self, so the real deceit in this ascription may have in fact been towards himself rather than the reader, which makes reading late Nietzsche a very complex matter. If we take his radical perspectivism to its end conclusion, then we inevitably all reach the same position, and the main question becomes no longer "what is true?" but "what lie do I want to believe in?"
I am not sure what you're referencing to with this position of Nietzsche concerning lie. Where can I find it in more detail?
I don't have a direct reference, but his championing of the Dionysian, and all of Zarathustra's praise for the one who "goes under," is fundamentally about embracing the creative power of untruth. He concluded that Plato was a great artist who peddled one big lie to his students and in doing so realized the sheer creative power of language.
Does this mean that Nietzsche didn't genuinely believe in the eternal recurrence, the overman, or the will to power. No. He did, however, seemed to understand that these were merely expressions of his own will; i.e., he was not "discovering" truth at all, but "creating" new meaning.
This is also something I have noticed, especially the last part about which lie. To some degree I generally believe early existentialists just encountered intellectual paralysis when it came to defining certain aspects after they spent so much time and effort dismantling the previous efforts knowing full well they would become subject to the same treatment. I personally will admit that I am not that much of a fan of his later works and I can see the argument to be had and why just classifying him can be a headache, he ultimately did himself a disservice or just stared into his own abyss too long.
Can you give me an example of what you mean by his ''part about lying''?
Well, in TL he makes a distinct epistemological argument that truth has become like a worn coin and everything we purportedly know to be true is nothing more than disimulation. In WP he says something along the lines of self-contentment is as little a standard for that to which it relates as it's absence is an argument against the value of a thing. He rejects nihilism in a number of places and claims he is trying to complete the revaluation of all values. His will to power is essentially his attempt and it is more or less relativistic at best and so ill-defined overall that nearly anyone can fall under its purview since it is essentially just the act of being alive and capable of exerting influence on the outside world in some way. There is nothing new actually ventured, and his relativistic outlook can be justification for whatever "necessary lie" people tell themselves. His epistemological argument isn't unsound, he knew full well it could be used against him if he tried to assert any truths and he chose not to and instead offered his token view of the act of existing imo, I'm not singling him out either, other early existentialist thinkers fall prey to it as well.
Truth and Lies is one of the earliest productions of his. But still, what is so controversial about that claim? Isn't the concept of Will to Power already clear? Truth is always scorned by Nietzsche in his writings, which is what WTP implies.
>He rejects nihilism in a number of places and claims he is trying to complete the revaluation of all values
Nietzsche's relation with nihilism is way more complicated because he himself recognizes nihilism as some rudimentary step for overcoming it. In WTP he says that nihilism can act as a force.
>His will to power is essentially his attempt
No, it is not, as I explained above. It is not with WTP that he will overcome nihilism, nihilism itself is already an expression of WTP.
>his relativistic outlook can be justification for whatever "necessary lie" people tell themselves
Again, I need a reference for what you were talking about the ''importance of lying'', this necessity of lying to oneself. What you are saying about ''lie'' is simply Nietzsche's attack on transcendental truths. Is Kant's Practical Reason a ''necessary lie that we have to tell ourselves''? Are fideists apologists of lies and lying to oneself? Do you believe Art, most important aspect of value-creation for Nietzsche, to fit into these deceitful contrivances of liars that lie to themselves? What the hell are you on about?
The first reference isn't from WP granted, but disimulation is in fact a form or lying. He is pointedly saying truth is a false pretense, otherwise he wouldn't have used the word. I wasn't implying nihilism is something impotent, but unless you can strictly define the will to power within Nietzsche's work you haven't invalidated my claim it is little more than just existing with some ability to exert influence on the outside world, nihilist interpretation or no. While we are on this topic, it was published by his sister after he had his breakdown and it also contains the following passages: 1. Truth is a cloak for quite different drives and impulses. 2. The pathos of Truth is based on belief. 3. The drive to lie is fundamental. 4. Truth cannot be recognized. Everything which is knowable is an illusion. The significance of art as truthful illusion. Art is only a form of truth because it treats illusion as being an illusion, which is also grounds for it being a form of lie since it is after all an illusion according Nietzsche. I have heard the arguments it was written after birth of tragedy and yet his sister had to publish it later? Why? Perhaps he knew it could simply be used against him, and his whole revaluation of values was little more than a sham and the will to power was the best alternative he could generate. He was resentful of the guy who did the revaluation merely because he used superior logic to come to similar conclusions, and that is why Kant is the superior philosopher, even by Nietzsche's definition.
You cited an early source for his attacks on truth but still insists that it was something condensed in his later writings. He has multiple attacks on it throughout his work, in BGE this is repetitive. Anyhow, the Will to Power is filled with aphorisms dating from the first half of the 1880s, not only from the last years of its decade.
Nietzsche sees in truth nothing but a moral prejudice and a path to nihilism. Truth and its pursuit will either banish any action (think of the Pyrrhonist dilemma, for example, or the immeasurable extent of this pursuit) or moralize action with an ought, the will to command, which is the end of every single one who posits a truth. So how can there be life in this way? There is no life without self-affirmation, without it your life is someone else's. The dialectical relation truth-falsity does not apply when Art and the Beautiful for Nietzsche goes way beyond truth, and thus goes beyond lie, because neither are given in life. The only knowledge is this Tragic Knowledge. What is the Tragic? A tonic, a stimulant for life.
>I have heard the arguments it... written after birth of tragedy and yet his sister had to publish it later? Why?
It is a collection of writings spanning from early to late 1880s that were not published. You have many other writings of his from even earlier in the 1770s that are also collected in other post-mortem collections.
>Perhaps he knew it could simply be used against him, and his whole revaluation of values was sham and the will to power was the best alternative he could generate
How could the things he wrote repetitively in different books, published, be used against him now in an unpublished collection? AGAIN: The Will to Power is not the revaluation, it is not a value.
>1. Truth is a cloak for quite different drives and impulses
Yes, as I also have explained.
>3. The drive to lie is fundamental
Again, you give no context, you don't cite a single quote directly from his writings. What is this fundamental referring to? Fundamental to what? There is no passage with this written.
>4. Truth cannot be recognized
Not in the transcendental way realists claim, that the object of experience is necessarily identical to the object in itself.
>Kant
He was not resentful of Kant because he made a revaluation, the analogy of the fox proves this is not even the case. Kant's Practical Reason literally posits the thing in itself as a form to circumvent the Critical Reason that reduces experience to: Appearances, Representations! What does this new value of Practical Reason posits as thing in itself? God, morality, immortality of soul, judgement of actualized life, etc. Where the hell is the revaluation? And I have heard that Nietzsche is very much inspired by Kant's Third Critique about freedom and feeling of life. If anything, Nietzsche attacks Kant for Kant's betrayal of himself (again echoes the metaphor of the fox) with his Practical Reason, his values and justification for action.
You specifically asked for references to lying from Nietzsche and I provided them. You mentioned his later works, which by publishing date I also provided. I asked for specific definitions for the will to power to invalidate my argument from Nietzsche and you failed to provide them. Where does Nietzsche specifically say Kant is a fox who escaped his cage? It sounds like I am talking with someone who is unwilling to use source material from Nietzsche to make an argument about Nietzsche, and I want to say I am not opposed to that, but being that is the case, you haven't yet invalidated anything I have argued thus far, and unless you can start providing material, you probably should stop asking for it since you aren't doing yourself any favors here. If we look at BGE which you just cited he is pretty insulting towards Kant, which you end your post by saying he has no resentment.
>You specifically asked for references to lying from Nietzsche and I provided them
I'll repeat: ''you give no context, you don't cite a single quote directly from his writings''
>I asked for specific definitions for the will to power to invalidate my argument from Nietzsche and you failed to provide them
Literally read the thread. I talk about it here
, citing directly from him.
>Where does Nietzsche specifically say Kant is a fox who escaped his cage?
Gay Science.
>It sounds like I am talking with someone who is unwilling to use source material from Nietzsche to make an argument about Nietzsche
That's it. I'm finished. I can't keep going with someone like this. You didn't even read my last post and will keep repeating I haven't said anything, whatever. Meaningless talk.
>he is pretty insulting towards Kant
He is insulting towards every other philosopher, including the ones he admired, Kant, Schopenhauer.
>which you end your post by saying he has no resentment.
And I explained why there is no resentment involved in a completely retarded supposition that Kant himself argues contrary to yourself.
I'm leaving the thread now. A waste thus far.
My excerpts were taken directly from TL, aphorism 187 iirc. Your previously cited material is basically existing with the ability to exert influence on the outside world. It is as loose an argument as my insinuation made it out to be. I don't recall Nietzsche saying that in the Gay Science, I could be wrong, please provide an aphorism for me to reference if I am. I read your last post, and you reference a work by Nieztsche that shows this not to be the case, you kind of did my work for me on that one.
Kant took the whole world one step further...
Nietzsche is nothing !
>Why do I rarely see anyone talk about Nietzsche's arguments against Kant on here? This is one of the most important parts of Nietzsche's thought and it's what sets him apart from most philosophers.
Everyone after Kant countered or expanded on Kant.
The thing-in-itself is a retarded belief unless used to say things like "this is a rock/tree/toilet/crab/knife and this is objectively true".
Nietzsche attacked Kant's morality and moralisms specifically
>Has the answer Kant and niet have been looking for this entire time
You should look into Huang Lao
Why’s that?
>To summarize for the thread, Nietzsche argued against Kant's thing-in-itself from the standpoint that the notion of a veil was in itself part of the interpretation
thats Hegel
Nietzsche and Schoppy fans just don't get this one core fact
I wish I was naive enough to believe there was something “behind the curtain”
We are the curtain, what’s in front of it, and what’s behind it.
We certainly are the curtain which is the universe. But there’s nothing behind it except the mystery of consciousness in this universe where it seems out of place.
There is no distinction between any of those things.
new (you) dropped, unknown soldier
Wow, Nietzsche's arguments are trash. What a surprise, he's wrapped up in obscurantist bullshit and psychoanalytical games.